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ABSTRACT Drawing from resource-based theory, we argue that family firm franchisors behave 
and perform differently compared to non-family firm franchisors. Our theorizing suggests that 
compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family firm franchisor cultivates stronger relation-
ships with franchisees and provides them with more training. Yet, we predict that a family firm 
franchisor achieves lower performance than a non-family firm franchisor. We argue, however, 
that this performance relationship reverses itself  when family firm franchisors are older and 
larger. We test our hypotheses with a longitudinal dataset including a matched-pair sample of  
private U.S. family and non-family firm franchisors.
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INTRODUCTION
Franchising is acknowledged widely as a major worldwide driver of  entrepreneurial 
activity, enabling firms to grow and succeed by producing or distributing goods or 
services (Combs et al., 2004, 2011b). Franchising involves the process of  franchisors 
granting a franchisee and/or multiple-unit franchisees the right to market their branded 
goods or services as well as use their business practices and procedures (Combs et al., 
2004). As such, franchising constitutes a form of  corporate entrepreneurship, and more 
specifically, a type of  ‘external corporate venturing’ where an existing organization 
creates ‘semi-autonomous or autonomous organizational entities that reside outside the 
existing organizational domain’ (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999, p. 19) (see also Ellis and 
Taylor, 1987; von Hippel, 1977).
Journal of Management Studies ••:•• 2020
doi:10.1111/joms.12567
Address for reprints: Francesco Chirico, Department of  Management, Macquarie Business School – Macquarie 
University, 4 Eastern Road, NSW 2109, Sydney, Australia (francesco.chirico@mq.edu.au).
This is an open access article under the terms of  the Creat ive Commo ns Attri bution License, which per-
mits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2 F. Chirico et al. 
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management 
Studies and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Interestingly, family firms – organizations that are owned and managed by a family 
(Chirico et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2007) are the dominant organizational form through-
out the global economy (see Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Neckebrouck et al., 2018; Schulze 
and Gedajlovic, 2010). These firms participate actively in franchising (Wadsworth and 
Jackson, 2004). Recent discussions highlight the significance of  family firms in the fran-
chising industry (Welsh and Hoy, 2017); several studies support this notion as well (e.g., 
Armitage and Wolfe, 2009; ICED, 2010; Rowlinson, 2010; Welsh and Raven, 2011). 
However, only a limited amount of  research focuses on franchising as an entrepreneurial 
activity in family firms (e.g., Chirico et al., 2011a; Kaufmann, 1999; Welsh and Raven, 
2011). Given entrepreneurship’s importance to efforts to develop countries and regions’ 
economies, this core issue warrants additional attention. For example, comparing fran-
chising in family versus non-family firms has the potential to enhance our understanding 
of  whether, how, and under what conditions these organizational forms differ in terms 
of  behaviours and performance in franchising as a key entrepreneurial activity (Ketchen 
et al., 2011).
Scholars use various theoretical perspectives to study franchising (see Combs et al., 
2011b, 2011c); however, the resource-based view is key to efforts to explain the fran-
chising phenomenon in general and franchising behaviours and performance in partic-
ular (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Combs et al., 2011b). 
Importantly, the resource-based view suggests that franchising behaviours and perfor-
mance outcomes should differ considerably between family firms and non-family firms. 
This is because a main feature that distinguishes family firms from non-family firms is 
their distinctive bundles of  resources that emerge through the interaction between the 
family and the business systems (Eddleston et al., 2008; Habbershon et al., 2003; Sirmon 
and Hitt, 2003). Unique resource bundles, in turn, have important implications for 
franchising (Combs et al., 2011c), as sharing unique, yet, complementary resources be-
tween the franchisor and the franchisee is a core element of  franchising, leading to joint 
value-creating benefits (Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Ketchen et al., 2007).
Drawing from the resource-based view of  the firm, we theorize that family firm fran-
chisors behave and perform differently compared to non-family firm franchisors. In terms 
of  behaviour, we argue that a family firm franchisor establishes stronger relationships 
with franchisees and provides them with more training. We focus on these two facets of  
franchising as these are essential aspects of  how to share resources and create value in 
franchising (Chirico et al., 2011a; Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Ketchen et al., 2007). 
Strong relationships facilitate resource sharing (Chrisman et al., 2009) and allow superior 
information exchange (Baucus et al., 1996; Dant and Nasr, 1998). As such, strong rela-
tionships can enable collaborating parties to form and use resources that have strategic 
value (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In addition, providing training to franchisees is a useful 
tool to familiarize them with the franchisor’s procedures, operations, best practices, and 
management approaches (Gillis et al., 2014). As a result, training for franchisees consti-
tutes an important learning opportunity where the trainees can develop and enhance 
their skills and capabilities (Miller et al., 2008). Given these expectations, extant fran-
chising literature has investigated the strength of  the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
(e.g., Chirico et al., 2011a; Davies et al., 2011) and training activities (e.g., El Akremi 
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et al., 2015; Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013) to explain the franchising phenomena 
and related outcomes. With respect to performance, we theorize that family firm fran-
chisors achieve a lower level of  performance than non-family firm franchisors; however, 
we expect a reversal of  this outcome when family firm franchisors are older and larger. 
Empirically, we rely on secondary data from FRANdata, which is a reliable source of  
objective information regarding franchise operations in the United States. Information 
is extracted directly from federal Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs). Our analysis 
of  a longitudinal matched-pair sample of  U.S. family- and non-family firm franchisors 
generally confirms our theoretical expectations.
Our results yield several contributions. First, we contribute to the corporate entrepre-
neurship literature. On a general level, we demonstrate that franchising is a relevant and 
unique type of  corporate entrepreneurship (see Ketchen et al., 2011; Ucbasaran et al., 
2001) in the form of  external corporate venturing (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). On a 
more specific level, we advance the literature concerned with corporate entrepreneur-
ship in family firms (see McKelvie et al., 2014). By focusing on family firms as a specific 
context (Davidsson et al., 2001), we enhance our understanding of  differences in entre-
preneurial behaviour between family and non-family firm franchisors and shed light on 
key contingency factors that affect performance. As such, we enrich the discussion about 
whether family firms are more or less entrepreneurial than non-family firms (Eddleston 
et al., 2012; Randolph et al., 2017) and how this relates to performance differences 
(Miller and LeBreton-Miller, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In addition, we advance 
our understanding of  whether (or not) the family firm’s commitment to entrepreneurial 
actions, such as franchising, erodes over time and with advances in firm size (Barringer 
and Bluedorn, 1999; Naldi et al., 2007).
Second, we contribute to the small but expanding body of  research concerned with 
franchising within family firms. Drawing from resource-based arguments, we develop 
novel theorizing to predict the behavioural and performance-related implications of  
being a family firm franchisor in a franchising context. This allows us to better under-
stand the franchising phenomenon and to isolate the related theoretical reasons for dif-
ferences in franchising behaviours and performance among franchisors. Additionally, 
our theorizing facilitates the field’s efforts to understand previous contradicting theoret-
ical arguments and results regarding the effects of  firm age and size on franchisor out-
comes (e.g., Castrogiovanni et al., 1993, 2006b; Combs and Ketchen, 2003).
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Franchising as a Form of  Corporate Entrepreneurship
Generally, franchising is understood as a long-term business arrangement wherein one 
firm (the franchisor) grants the right to market goods or services under its brand name 
and to use its business practices, processes, and routines to another firm (the franchisee) 
(Combs et al., 2004, 2009, 2011b). The franchisee, in turn, leverages its idiosyncratic 
knowledge of  the local environment resource, including competitors’ activities, and 
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applies it to the franchisor’s business model (Combs et al., 2011b). Importantly, franchis-
ing represents a form of  firm-level corporate entrepreneurship (Ketchen et al., 2011; 
Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Sharma and Chrisman (1999, p. 20) define corporate 
entrepreneurship as ‘the process whereby an individual or a group of  individuals, in 
association with an existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal 
or innovation within that organization’ and suggest that a key element of  corporate en-
trepreneurship is ‘external corporate venturing,’ where an existing organization creates 
semi-autonomous or autonomous entities outside its own boundaries that may vary in 
their degree of  separateness from the parent company (Ellis and Taylor, 1987; Sharma 
and Chrisman, 1999; von Hippel, 1977). In the context of  our work, the franchisor is the 
existing parent company that creates new organizational entities outside its own bound-
aries (i.e., the different franchisees).
Overall, franchising plays a key role in developed economies. For instance, in the United 
States, 745,290 (+1.6 per cent compared to the previous year) franchise establishments 
in 2017 employed 7,881,000 (+3.1 per cent) individuals with $713.2 (+5.6%) billion 
in output and contributed $425.5 billion (+5.1 per cent) to the nation’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).[1 ] These data suggest the importance of  franchising and with respect to 
our arguments, the importance of  franchising as a form of  corporate entrepreneurship.
Franchising and Resource-Based Theory
Scholars use an array of  theoretical perspectives, and combinations of  them, to examine 
franchising. Examples of  theories franchising scholars use include agency theory and re-
source scarcity considerations (e.g., Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Castrogiovanni et al., 
2006b; Combs and Ketchen, 1999a). Explaining the emergence of  franchising as a means 
of  organizing (see Combs et al., 2011b; Gillis and Castrogiovanni, 2012) and describing 
key characteristics of  the organizing process, such as the choice between company-owned 
and franchised units and the related ownership redirection hypothesis, are examples of  
issues explored by scholars using these two theories (e.g., Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; 
Castrogiovanni et al., 2006b; Combs and Ketchen, 1999a). Scholars also use property 
rights theory to explain ownership redirection in franchising (Windsperger and Dant, 
2006) and the emergence of  multi-unit franchising (Hussain and Windsperger, 2013). 
Institutional theory (Barthélemy, 2011; Combs et al., 2009), signalling theory (Dant and 
Kaufmann, 2003), social exchange theory (Meek et al., 2011) or a combination of  agency 
theory and institutional theory (Barthélemy, 2008) are also used frequently in franchising 
research (for an overview, see Combs et al., 2011b). However, multiple reasons lead us to 
draw from resource-based theory as our primary theoretical lens.
In our study, we seek to explain differences in franchising behaviours and performance 
between family and non-family franchisors. Resource-based theory is particularly ap-
propriate to frame arguments around our research question. For instance, Combs and 
Ketchen (1999a, p. 204) argue that the resource-based view ‘with its emphasis on the link 
between organizational capabilities and competitive advantage seems likely to offer addi-
tional insight into franchising behaviour’. Castrogiovanni et al. (2006a, p. 40) suggest that 
‘researchers should consider resource-based theory as a complementary explanation of  
franchising behaviour’. With respect to firm performance, resource-based theory seeks 
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to explain sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). To exploit a competitive 
advantage, ‘firms must possess resources that can be used to create inimitable and rare 
value for customers’ (Ireland et al., 2002, p. 428). Through different mechanisms, in-
cluding training and strong relationships, franchisors and franchisees seek to find ways to 
accumulate resources internally that facilitate their efforts to create inimitable and rare 
value for customers.
Due to the relationship between resource-based arguments and the nature of  franchis-
ing, many scholars use this theory to study franchising behaviours and resulting perfor-
mance outcomes (e.g., Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013; 
Wu, 2015). Moreover, resource-based theory helps predict franchising behaviours and 
performance in that it notes that firms use their unique resource bundles as the foun-
dation for value creation by developing and exploiting competitive advantages (Barney, 
1991; Harrison et al., 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007). Value-creating resources are assets 
and capabilities that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Combs et al., 
2011a; Morrow et al., 2007). Sirmon et al. (2007, p. 273) highlight this point by noting 
that ‘… the RBV suggests that possessing valuable and rare resources provides the basis 
for value creation’.
A main motive for using franchising as an organizational form is to structure, bundle 
and leverage (i.e., resource management; Sirmon et al., 2007) scarce resources such as 
capital and managerial resources between the franchisor and franchisees to foster rapid 
growth and performance improvements (Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly, 1969). Resource-based theory, and in particular the ‘extended’ resource-based 
logic, also predicts that firm-specific internal resources are not the only source of  com-
petitive advantages; rather, organizations can benefit from a wide array of  external re-
sources without having full control over them (see, for instance, Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Gulati et al., 2000; Ireland et al., 2002). That is, organizations can engage in interfirm 
cooperation arrangements to share resources across organizational boundaries and gen-
erate joint value-creating benefits (Cao et al., 2010; Lavie, 2006; Li et al., 2008). Given 
that a key aspect of  franchising is interfirm resource sharing between franchisor and 
franchisees, this logic applies particularly well to the franchising context (Combs et al., 
2004).
In a franchisor-franchisee relationship, sharing complementary resources is founda-
tional to efforts to mitigate resource constraints and enhance the value-creating ability 
of  both parties (Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Ketchen et al., 2007). Put differently, it is 
difficult for a single firm to possess or control all resources required to outperform rivals. 
Through franchising, the franchisor and franchisee can combine their resources to create 
bundles with the capability to create more value than either party would create acting 
independently (Harrison et al., 1991; Makri et al., 2010). Through competitive advan-
tages developed by integrating unique resource bundles, the franchisor and franchisee 
increase the likelihood of  reaching desired performance objectives (Combs and Ketchen, 
1999b). Experiences resulting from firm age and additional assets resulting from firm size 
enhance a firm’s ability to recognize and use resources it would like to add to its resource 
portfolio as a foundation for creating additional value (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006b).
As noted previously, we believe that resource-based theory is particularly appropriate 
to investigate behavioural and performance differences between family and non-family 
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firm franchisors. This is because a crucial characteristic of  family-owned firms that dis-
tinguishes them from non-family firms is the ability to create unique resource bundles 
that are a product of  idiosyncratic interactions between the family and the business. 
Some of  these unique interactions may occur, for instance, during training sessions 
franchisors provide to franchisees. Compared to non-family firms, family firms are in 
fact more complex, dynamic, and resource rich, particularly in terms of  the set of  in-
tangible resources (Eddleston et al., 2008; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) that originate from 
interactions among the family, its individual members, and the business (Habbershon 
et al., 2003; Habbershon and Williams, 1999). As such, these unique resource bun-
dles provide them with a resource base for which non-family firms find duplication 
difficult (Pearson et al., 2008) and which has important implications in a franchising 
setting (Chirico et al., 2011a; Combs et al., 2011c). Examples of  resources a franchisor 
may provide are copyrights, patents on formulas, registered brands, networks, proce-
dures and operations, best practices, purchasing power, and management/marketing 
assistance and advice (Gillis et al., 2014). Resources shared by a franchisee may be 
financial capital, local knowledge (e.g., in relation to the market, the culture, customer 
preferences and needs), local networks (i.e., alliances with other franchisees, marketing 
connections), and local reputation and goodwill (e.g., charitable giving to small league 
teams) (Chirico et al., 2011a; Combs et al., 2004). By sharing complementary resources 
such as these, benefits accrue to the franchising parties. In addition, an expectation is 
that both parties will experience greater economies of  scale in organizational functions 
such as purchasing, marketing, and legal affairs. For instance, some franchising studies 
examine practices through which social relationships and training facilitate efforts to re-
tain valued human capital (e.g., El Akremi et al., 2015; Perdreau et al., 2015; Stanworth 
et al., 2004).
Reputation, defined as the general level of  favourability stakeholders have of  a partic-
ular firm (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013), is another valuable resource for franchising 
parties. Describing this value, Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2005, p. 445) note that 
reputation is ‘one of  the most important strategic resources’ for a firm to possess. Because 
of  its value, reputation is often an important contributor to a firm’s efforts to create sus-
tainable competitive advantages (Griessmair et al., 2014).
In the franchising context, evidence suggests that a franchisor’s positive brand name 
reputation has the potential to enhance its performance (see Barthélemy, 2008; Combs 
and Ketchen, 1999b; Wu, 2015). Identity overlaps between the family and its business 
(Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2013) explain some of  the reputation’s 
importance as a resource in a family business. This overlap implies a family’s explicit 
concern about the firm’s reputation with external stakeholders as it can in turn affect 
the reputation of  the family as well. The evidence suggests that reputation is a unique 
family-influenced resource with numerous benefits at the firm-level (Habbershon et al., 
2003; Pearson et al., 2008) such as enhanced entrepreneurial behaviour (Clinton 
et al., 2013; Sieger et al., 2011) or improved performance and value creation (Rindova 
et al., 2010; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Shane and Cable, 2002). Due to its importance, 
we consider reputation as a critical resource for franchisors in our study.[2 ]
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Franchising and the Family Firm
There are many definitions of  family firms (Sharma, 2004); however, family involvement 
in terms of  ownership and management are the most commonly used criteria to identify 
a family business (see, for instance, Astrachan et al., 2002). This position is highlighted 
by Arregle et al. (2007, p. 87) who state that ‘a business firm may be considered a family 
business to the extent that its ownership and management are concentrated within a 
family unit.’ As such, family firms are organizations that a family owns and manages, as 
depicted commonly in many empirical family business studies (e.g., Chirico et al., 2019; 
Miller et al., 2007).
Evidence suggests a strong presence of  family firms in the franchising context (e.g., 
ICED, 2010; Welsh and Hoy, 2017; Welsh and Raven, 2011). For example, in Welsh 
and Raven’s (2011) sample, 35 of  81 franchises were family-owned. Examples of  family 
firm franchisors from the United States in this sample include Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 
Chick-Fil-A, and Five Guys. Some scholars envision family firm franchising as an area 
in which there are interesting research questions to explore (Combs et al., 2011c). The 
availability of  questions to examine and the prominence of  family firms as an organiza-
tional form used widely throughout the world (Gedajlovic et al., 2012) make it surprising 
that studies about family firms and franchising are scarce.
In our theorizing, using resource-based arguments, we focus on two of  the most cru-
cial elements of  a franchising agreement: the relationship between a franchisor and its 
franchisee and the training the franchisor provides to the latter (see, for instance, Combs 
et al., 2004). As discussed earlier, these aspects are essential for resource sharing as a 
foundation for creating value through franchising (Chirico et al., 2011a; Combs and 
Ketchen, 1999b; Ketchen et al., 2007). Because of  their importance, scholars investigate 
these two franchising aspects frequently (e.g., Davies et al., 2011; El Akremi et al., 2015; 
Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013). In our study, we also consider performance outcomes 
and related important contingency factors (Combs and Ketchen, 2003).
HYPOTHESES
The Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship
We suggest that family firm franchisors are more likely to build stronger relationships 
with their franchisees than non-family franchisors. There are several reasons for this 
expectation. First, a long-term perspective and time horizon is a feature attributed com-
monly to family firms (Zellweger et al., 2012). In turn, achieving success over time re-
quires family firm franchisors to establish strong, long-lasting interfirm relationships with 
their franchisees (see Miller et al., 2007). As such, compared to non-family franchisors, 
who likely have a shorter time horizon, family firm franchisors have a greater incentive 
to establish trust-based, strong, durable interactions with their franchisees. These types 
of  interactions are the foundation for family firm franchisors being able to share comple-
mentary resources with franchisees with a high degree of  confidence. This type of  trust-
based sharing of  complementary resources yields synergies that are far more difficult for 
franchisors and franchisees operating more independently of  each other to develop.
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Owing to their commitment to sharing complementary resources as a means to ac-
cumulate value-creating assets internally (see Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 279) for the benefit 
of  both parties in the franchising system and to be able to facilitate long-term success in 
the process of  doing so (Chirico et al., 2011b), family firm franchisors are likely to invest 
more time and effort in building and cultivating the franchisee-franchisor relationship 
than a non-family firm franchisor. Drawing from a generational perspective and the view 
of  patient capital as an important resource for long-term success, Sirmon and Hitt (2003) 
suggest that family firms are in a position to establish richer interfirm relationships. In 
turn, these relationships facilitate efforts by the family firm franchisor to create value 
when collaborating with its franchisees. Relatedly, to ensure long-term success of  its fran-
chising business, family firm franchisors may also be more committed to expending extra 
efforts and resources to build stronger relationships with franchisees. Using resources in 
this manner likely generates patient capital and survivability capital – which are often a 
product of  family members combining business and family resources (Habbershon et al., 
2003) – for the franchising relationship (see Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; James, 
1999; Zellweger, 2007).
Social capital is a resource with the potential to facilitate firms’ efforts to create joint 
values (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002; Ketchen et al., 2007). As a resource, 
social capital involves trust, exchange, generosity, and solidarity (Bubolz, 2001). Due to 
close ties and commonly strong commitments to achieving objectives, a family firm is 
an ideal environment in which to establish social capital through which the firm cre-
ates value for stakeholders (Coleman, 1988). Thus, a family firm’s unique social capital 
is another resource distinguishing family firm franchisors from non-family franchisors. 
Arregle et al. (2007, p. 77) speak to this issue, noting that the social capital of  a family 
firm is ‘probably one of  the most enduring and powerful forms of  social capital’. In the 
franchising context then, compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family firm fran-
chisor is likely to better use its rich social capital to build and sustain stronger and more 
stable relationships with its franchisees with accepted norms and routine interactions 
as the foundation. This facilitates interfirm resource sharing (Chrisman et al., 2009; 
Duschek, 2004; Lavie, 2006) and information exchange (Baucus et al., 1996; Dant and 
Nasr, 1998; Ketchen et al., 2007) and ultimately enhances the likelihood of  the fran-
chise’s long-term continuity.
Lastly, because of  identity overlaps between a family and its firm (Dyer and Whetten, 
2006; Zellweger et al., 2013), the family firm franchisor has strong incentives to establish 
and ensure a favourable franchisor reputation with external stakeholders. A strong and 
stable relationship between the family firm franchisor and its franchisees contributes to 
such a positive reputation. In contrast, a weak relationship between these parties has the 
potential to affect the reputation of  the family firm franchisor and the family itself  neg-
atively. In sum, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family firm franchisor builds 
stronger relationships with its franchisees.
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Franchisees’ Training
A core part of  the franchising agreement is the training of  franchisees (Combs et al., 
2004) through which resources are shared and competencies built beyond organizational 
boundaries (Das and Teng, 2000; Ireland et al., 2002; Lavie, 2006). Building competen-
cies supports efforts by the franchising partners to respond to changing customer needs 
consistently and effectively over time. A key objective franchisors have in training fran-
chisees is to develop the human capital embedded within those units (Sirmon et al., 
2007). Sharing and providing access to procedures, operations and routines, and general 
management/marketing knowledge and advice to franchisees is one path through which 
franchisors seek to develop human capital in those units (Gillis et al., 2014). Classroom 
training and/or on-the-job training are actions franchisors take to develop human cap-
ital in their franchisees (see El Akremi et al., 2015; Perdreau et al., 2015; Stanworth 
et al., 2004).
For several reasons, we expect that family firm franchisors are likely to provide more 
continuous training to their franchisees than non-family firm franchisors. On a general 
level, evidence indicates that family firms provide an environment that fosters a family- 
oriented workplace, which in turn inspires greater employee commitment and loyalty 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Habbershon and Williams, 1999). Put differently, employers and 
employees build trust and even friendships, which in turn results in more motivated and 
loyal employees. Consequently, the actions of  these individuals and groups have positive 
effects on the family firm’s prosperity and long-term continuity (Ling and Kellermanns, 
2010).
Therefore, family firms commit considerable resources to ongoing training and learn-
ing opportunities, including internships that develop employees more fully as a valu-
able resource and provide critical motivational opportunities for personal growth (Miller 
et al., 2008). Compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to train and 
further develop their employees on an ongoing basis because of  their strong commitment 
to family firm continuity (Miller et al., 2008). We argue that these patterns apply to the 
franchisor-franchisee context as well. This means that compared to a non-family firm 
franchisor, a family firm franchisor is more likely to devote time and resources to provide 
training to franchisees. This additional training, both in class and on-the-job, has the 
capability to expand the skills of  each franchisee’s human capital and to develop social 
capital in each franchisee unit by developing feelings of  belonging to the business and the 
family (Miller et al., 2008). Such behaviours may further support a friendly and an infor-
mal organizational culture based on loyal and cohesive group relationships (Zahra et al., 
2004). These relationships, in turn, provide motivation for the family firm franchisor and 
its franchisees to work collaboratively to achieve common interests.
Family firm reputation is another key reason we anticipate family-firm franchisors to 
provide more training to franchisees than will non-family firm franchisees. As mentioned 
previously, a family firm’s reputation is a unique family-influenced resource (Habbershon 
et al., 2003; Pearson et al., 2008; Sieger et al., 2011). Because of  identity overlaps be-
tween the family and the business (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2013), 
family members express concerns about the firm’s reputation with external stakeholders 
in that it affects their family reputation as well. Within the franchising context, this means 
10 F. Chirico et al. 
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management 
Studies and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
that when a franchisee exhibits deviant behaviours such as not meeting the requirements 
and not following the guidelines and procedures as defined in the franchising agreement, 
this likely will have a negative effect on the reputation of  the franchisee, the franchisor, 
and ultimately, the family owning the franchise (Sieger et al., 2011). Therefore, compared 
to non-family firm franchisors, family firm franchisors have a stronger incentive to en-
sure that franchisees behave as they should; effective ongoing training programs (Miller 
et al., 2008) are a path with the potential to reduce the likelihood of  inappropriate and 
ineffective franchisee behaviors. Put differently, because of  the desire to avoid negative 
reputation implications for the family through a franchisee’s behaviours, we expect family 
firm franchisors to invest more in franchisee training than non-family firm franchisors.
Finally, as mentioned above, family firms typically have a longer term perspective and 
time horizon than non-family firms (Zellweger et al., 2012). We suggest that this perspec-
tive also manifests itself  through training that seeks to provide franchisees with important 
managerial and operational input, ensuring that franchisor and franchisee ‘remain on 
the same page’ in the long run. Following the above arguments, we therefore posit:
Hypothesis 2: Compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family firm franchisor pro-
vides more training to its franchisees.
Franchisor’s Performance
Resource-based logic suggests that family firm franchisors are more willing and able to 
seek to accumulate resources by sharing complementary resources with franchisees (e.g., 
human capital through training). In turn, we expect that the sharing of  resources will 
yield performance capabilities that are specific to each franchising situation because of  
the unique resources themselves as well as the idiosyncratic interactions between a fran-
chisor and its franchisees through which resources are used (Habbershon et al., 2003; 
Pearson et al., 2008; Zahra, 2010). As a result, intensive sharing of  unique resources 
across organizations has the potential to be a source of  competitive advantage (Duschek, 
2004; Lavie, 2006) and subsequently, of  superior financial performance for family firm 
franchisors as compared to non-family firm franchisors.
We theorize, however, that this is not necessarily the case due to path-dependent be-
haviours that influence family firm franchisors’ financial outcomes (see Zahra, 2005). 
In fact, an option family firms often use is retention of  the status quo. Doing this mires 
family firms ‘in a single way of  seeing and doing things’, thus ‘converting a formula for 
success into a path toward failure’ (Miller, 1993, pp. 116, 122) while supposedly preserv-
ing the family and the business. Specifically, as Sirmon et al. (2007) explain, path de-
pendency can limit the design of  future resource-leveraging strategies. This is important 
in that evidence suggests that family firms often engage in path-dependent behaviours 
(König et al., 2013) that provide a sense of  familiarity for family members who perceive 
past solutions as being less risky than attempting a de novo solution to exploiting an 
opportunity (Hoskisson et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2003; Zahra, 2005). Such path de-
pendence may increase the risk that the family firm franchisor and related franchising 
activity could fall into what Ahuja and Lampert (2001) call a familiarity trap that ‘limit[s] 
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the openness to information and to alternative ways of  doing things, producing collective 
blindness’ (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 245).
Thus, family firm franchisors may tend to replicate inherited organizational routines 
and strategic perspectives, especially when the resources in question contributed to prior 
success (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Subsequently, the emphasis may shift more to address-
ing problems and making decisions in light of  past behaviours rather than seeking to 
identify and exploit new opportunities (Chirico et al., 2011a). The organizational rigidity 
resulting from this type of  path dependence may prevent the franchising business from 
developing an ability to adapt to changing circumstances. When this happens, family- 
firm decision makers may envision conditions surfacing in the external context as threats 
rather than as potential opportunities. Such a perspective reinforces a cycle of  defensive 
behaviours that, at least in part, decision makers use to preserve the status quo (Miller 
et al., 2003).
Moreover, while we expect family firm franchisors to establish stronger relationships 
with and to provide more training for their franchisees by sharing complementary re-
sources, this expectation does not necessarily imply that family firm franchisors will 
achieve higher performance than non-family firm franchisors. This can happen as fam-
ily firm franchisors and their franchisees may share interfirm resources that are obso-
lete or competitively inferior. In turn, this type of  sharing finds firms using outdated 
behavioural paths. Typically, for instance, the training programs and routines the fran-
chisor provides to the franchisee reside in the franchisor’s established routines – routines 
that at some point support the status quo (Hackman et al., 1976). Put differently, as an 
organizational resource, long-established routines in family firm franchisors may find 
the firms falling into a familiarity trap (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). As organizations 
gain increasing familiarity with their resources and bundles of  them and the outcomes 
that are possible by using them, the tendency to rely too much on them increases. A 
negative unintended consequence of  the familiarity trap is that a firm’s ability to identify 
new resource combinations as a means of  improving performance decreases (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001). In addition, the strength of  the desire to maintain existing family rela-
tionships (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004) and the routines making them possible may 
result in family firm franchisors failing, for instance, to upgrade the quality of  their train-
ing programs for franchisees on a consistent basis. Without appropriate enhancements to 
the programs’ contents, franchisees’ performances may decline.
Owing to the intention to avoid conflicts and preserve harmony while sharing re-
sources, family firm franchisors and their franchisee may also tend to agree on the ‘small-
est common denominator’ to avoid placing their relationship at risk (Hoskisson et al., 
2017; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004). This tendency though may result in less inno-
vative and entrepreneurial behaviour, outcomes that likely fail to enhance the franchising 
arrangement’s performance, particularly from a financial perspective. This reasoning 
leads us to hypothesize that a family firm franchisor achieves lower performance than a 
non-family firm franchisor. Stated formally, we posit that:
Hypothesis 3: Compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family firm franchisor 
achieves lower performance.
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Franchisor’s Age and Size
We theorized that family and non-family firm franchisors differ in terms of  performance. 
Following previous studies (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; Combs and Ketchen, 2003; 
Combs et al., 2004), we now introduce the franchisor’s age and size as related crucial 
contingency factors.
Firm age and size are fundamental elements of  dyadic relational models (e.g., 
Bordonaba-Juste and Polo-Redondo, 2008; Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; Weaven and 
Frazer, 2003). Evidence suggests that these variables are important to efforts to explain 
firm survival and performance (see, for instance, Bruderl and Schussler, 1990; Ling et al., 
2007; Stinchcombe, 1965). Additionally, some scholars study the effects of  firm age and 
size on franchisor outcomes. Results from these studies show mixed effects (e.g., Combs 
and Ketchen, 2003; Kosová and Lafontaine, 2010; Lafontaine and Shaw, 1999). Some 
results indicate that franchisor age and size are reasonable proxies for learning outcomes 
(e.g., Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a). In other cases, results suggest that instead, they are 
associated with unit obsolescence (e.g., Castrogiovanni et al., 1993).
Although these studies yield mixed results, we assert that both learning outcomes and 
unit obsolescence may apply in the franchising context. However, we believe that their 
respective occurrence is more or less likely to happen depending on whether the fran-
chisor is a family or a non-family firm. The reason for this expectation is that a firm’s 
governance structure directs resource allocation and utilization decisions (Makadok, 
2001, 2003); accordingly, governance characteristics such as family versus non-family 
firm status likely affect franchising-based performance gains (Combs et al., 2004). For 
the reasons outlined below, we argue that increased firm age and size of  the franchisor 
combine to reverse the performance disadvantage of  family firm franchisors, with family 
firm franchisors then outperforming non-family firm franchisors.
First, we theorize that franchisor age and size are more likely to lead to positive perfor-
mance outcomes for family firm franchisors than for non-family firm franchisors. Family 
firms are regarded as high-trust and non-opportunistic organizations ‘governed by 
underlying informal agreements based on affect rather than on utilitarian logic or con-
tractual obligations’ (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001, p. 82). These family firm characteristics 
may promote behaviour that enables family firm franchisors to perform best as they age 
and grow, thus offsetting path-dependency and the related performance-constraining 
behaviours of  family firm franchisors we proposed previously. For example, family 
firm franchisors’ focus on the long-term success of  the franchising activity may lead to 
effective and efficient use of  existing resources and to important financial benefits over 
time (Strike et al., 2015; Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008). Additionally, large family firm 
franchisors may be particularly skilled in managing relationships and sharing resources 
with an increasing number of  franchisees and unit managers (Udell, 1973), thus contrib-
uting to positive outcomes. As such, when a family firm franchisor is older and larger, 
important family firm-specific learning processes (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a) occur, 
strengthening the value-creating potential of  the resources shared with franchisees; ulti-
mately, we expect this to have positive performance implications (Duschek, 2004; Lavie, 
2006). Relatedly, the family firm franchisor’s long-term perspective, care and devotion to 
franchisees and the franchising system of  activities, along with the use of  patient capital 
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and survivability capital (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003), have the potential to mitigate path- 
dependent behaviours and thus potentially enhance performance outcomes as the family 
firm ages and grows.
Second, some scholars argue that franchisor age and size are associated with unit ob-
solescence (e.g., Castrogiovanni et al., 1993). Yet, we believe that the danger of  unit ob-
solescence is not as prominent for family firm franchisors compared to non-family firm 
franchisors. This is because compared to family firm franchisors (Chirico et al., 2011a), 
non-family franchisors appear to be less capable of  sharing resources and managing 
long-term relationships with an increased number of  franchisees and unit managers 
(Bordonaba-Juste and Polo-Redondo, 2008; Bruderl and Schussler, 1990; Castrogiovanni 
et al., 1993). More specifically, research suggests that overall, mature and large non- 
family franchisors find it increasingly difficult to maintain or strengthen their relationships 
and resource sharing with both franchisees and their managers over time, thus making 
it more challenging for franchisors to achieve positive financial outcomes (Bordonaba-
Juste and Polo-Redondo, 2008; Watson and Johnson, 2010; Weaven and Frazer, 2003). 
Supporting this view, Bordonaba-Juste et al. (2011) and Castrogiovanni et al. (1993) 
report that franchisor age has a positive effect on failure while Kosová and Lafontaine 
(2010) report a negative effect of  franchisor age and size on chain growth. When the 
non-family franchisor is older and larger, franchisees appear to have less confidence 
that they are receiving significant value from the franchisor (Brizek, 2004). Such mature 
and large franchisors tend to become multi-unit operators (Bradach, 1997; Weaven and 
Frazer, 2003) to reduce interactions with both franchisees and their managers, thereby 
mitigating potential conflicts with them (e.g., Kaufmann and Kim, 1995; Winter et al., 
2012).
Additionally, evidence shows that firm age and size are antecedents of  a favourable 
reputation, also in the franchising context. Referring to age, corporate reputation in 
general is socially constructed (Lange et al., 2011), accumulates slowly (Fombrun, 1996), 
and is based on the multiple actions associated with an organization’s past (Flanagan 
and O’Shaughnessy, 2005). As such, companies in business over a longer time period 
can be assumed to have satisfied their stakeholders (at least minimally) over the years 
(Delgado-García et al., 2010; von Weizsacker, 1980), which contributes to the building of  
a positive reputation (Kosová and Lafontaine, 2010). With respect to firm size, Fombrun 
and Shanley (1990) found a strong positive link between this organizational character-
istic and corporate reputation. A possible explanation is that firm size signals a firm’s 
access to resources and enhances visibility. An implication of  visibility is that different 
stakeholders are aware of  the firm’s actions and can closely monitor its behaviour. This, 
in turn, leads to lower expropriation of  firm value and, ultimately, a more desirable 
or enhanced corporate reputation (Delgado-García et al., 2010). A number of  studies 
confirm the positive link between size and reputation (see Lange et al., 2011; Staw and 
Epstein, 2000). Therefore, the evidence suggests that the older and larger a franchisor 
is, the better should be its reputation. A desirable reputational resource has the potential 
to contribute positively to forming and exploiting a competitive advantage, ultimately 
resulting in enhanced firm performance (Rindova et al., 2010; Roberts and Dowling, 
2002; Shamsie, 2003).
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Thus, we conclude that reputation becomes more important in predicting franchisor 
performance with increases in franchisor age and size. This is important and intriguing 
in that on a general level, research results suggest that family firms tend to care more 
about their firm’s reputation than do non-family firms (Berrone et al., 2010; Deephouse 
and Jaskiewicz, 2013). As discussed earlier, because of  the business and family identities’ 
overlap, family firm members seek to ensure that their firm has a positive reputation with 
stakeholders (including customers and suppliers) in that a negative reputation for the firm 
with external stakeholders would also yield a negative reputation for the family (Dyer and 
Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2013). Therefore, compared to non-family firm franchi-
sors, family firm franchisors have greater incentives to consider their firm’s reputation 
as a vital resource requiring attention (Habbershon et al., 2003; Pearson et al., 2008; 
Sieger et al., 2011). Building on these arguments, we suggest that family firm franchisors, 
compared to non-family firm franchisors, have a stronger commitment to establishing 
a favourable reputation; in turn, a favourable or positive reputation increases its value- 
creating potential with increases in the franchisor’s age and size. That is, when a family 
firm franchisor ages and increases in size, reputation gains in relevance as a predictor of  
firm performance. Taken together, this leads us to suggest that because of  reputation- 
related dynamics, family firm franchisors outperform non-family firm franchisors when 
a franchisor is older and larger.
As a whole, there are reasons to expect that the performance pattern suggested in 
Hypothesis 3 will reverse in direction with increasing age and size. Formally stated:
Hypothesis 4: A three-way interaction among franchisor age, firm size, and family firm 
status positively affects performance in such a way that compared to a non-family firm 
franchisor, a family firm franchisor achieves higher performance when the franchisor 
is older and larger.
METHODS
Sample
Data regarding franchisors and franchisees are difficult to collect. For this study, we used 
a dataset from FRANdata (Information for the Franchise World) to test our hypotheses. 
Founded in 1989, FRANdata is the franchise industry’s main source for objective infor-
mation and analyses in the United States. Using its library of  FDDs along with both 
primary and public sources, FRANdata supports franchisors’ research and competitive 
intelligence functions, helps franchisees evaluate different concepts, provides informa-
tion and analyses for legal and financial organizations, and provides marketing access to 
franchisors and franchisees. FRANdata is the exclusive contractor for the Small Business 
Administration Franchise Registry and is the only comprehensive source for FDDs out-
side of  the U.S. federal government.[3 ]
We tested our hypotheses using a longitudinal sample of  private U.S. family and 
non-family firm franchisors included in the FRANdata source using an exact matched-pair 
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design (Kennedy, 2008). We took three primary steps to construct the sample. First, 
FRANdata identified family firm franchisors by manually inspecting a randomly selected 
set of  franchisors included in that group’s database. FRANdata identified one hundred 
firms as family firm franchisors if  two or more executives had the same family name; 
this is a well-established approach in empirical family business research (see, for instance, 
Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2013). Second, 
for each of  these family firm franchisors, FRANdata identified a matching non-family 
firm franchisor through the following matching variables: industry, subsector, and firm 
size,[4 ] leading to a sample of  200 companies. Third, we ensured that the firms identi-
fied as family firms by FRANdata are owned and managed by a family, meaning that 
ownership and management are concentrated within a family unit (Arregle et al., 2007; 
Astrachan et al., 2002). We did this by checking company websites, franchise industry 
reports, and newspaper articles, with supportive results. In addition, we called all franchi-
sors to confirm the family firm status. As some franchisors have a very restrictive policy of  
answering questions, we were not able to talk to all parties we attempted to contact. Even 
in these cases though, we were able to identify a sufficient amount of  secondary material 
as supportive documentation that firms were family-owned and managed. In the end, 
this procedure led us to exclude only one company that we could not identify as either 
a family or a non-family firm.[5 ] All these franchisors have their home office location in 
the USA, and the franchisees reported in the FDDs are US-based as well. We compared 
the mean values of  age, size, and industry of  this set of  firms with those of  all other 
firms included in the FRANdata database with t-tests and chi-square tests. We found no 
significant differences, a result indicating that our sample is representative of  the initial 
population. We retrieved data including the years from 2003 to 2007; thus, we do not 
cover the global economic crisis that started in 2008 which affected the behaviour and 
performance of  family and non-family firms in the following years considerably – com-
prising those active in the franchising sector (IHS Global Insight, 2011).[6 ] Therefore, 
our data collection period has a positive effect on the generalizability of  our findings.[7 ]
Measures
Dependent variables. Franchisor-franchisee relationship: We relied on two variables as a proxy for 
the strength of  the franchisor-franchisee relationship with the first one being the number 
of  contracts cancelled by the franchisor or franchisees (Klein, 1995; Spinelli and Birley, 
1996). Breach of  contract provisions, failure to make royalty payments, non-adherence 
to quality standards, and failing to meet sales goals are examples of  reasons for contract 
cancellations (Gandhi, 2014).[8 ] The second proxy is the number of  actions per year 
brought to court (litigation up to 10 years old) by either the franchisor or franchisees to 
enforce a particular right connected with the franchising activity (see Antia et al., 2013; 
Winsor et al., 2012). As expected, these two measures are highly correlated (coeff. = 0.54; 
p < 0.001). Training for franchisees: We relied on the total number of  training hours (in class 
and on-the-job training) the franchisor required the franchisees to attend, as indicated in 
the franchising contract (see Barron et al., 1997; Konings and Vanormelingen, 2015).[9 ] 
Performance: We used an accounting-based measure to capture performance – the log of  
Return on Assets (ROA) (net income/total assets). ROA is an indicator of  how profitable 
16 F. Chirico et al. 
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management 
Studies and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
a company is relative to its total assets and is a commonly used and well-established 
measure of  performance (e.g., Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Karniouchina et al., 2013; 
Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). In addition, ROA is particularly useful in the context 
of  our research because it captures the degree to which franchisors are deploying firm 
resources effectively as a means of  creating value. We also relied on alternative measures 
as proxies of  performance as reported in the robustness test section.
Independent variables. We used a binary measure of  family firm franchisors that was coded ‘1’ 
if  the franchisor is a family firm and ‘0’ if  the franchisor is a non-family firm, based 
on FRANdata’s identification (two or more executives with the same family name) and 
our corresponding verification procedure (family ownership and managerial control). 
Additionally, to capture the variance within family firm franchisors, we used a continuous 
measure of  family involvement indicating the number of  family executives managing the firm 
(Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). All firms without family 
executives were considered non-family firm franchisors and were coded as 0, making the 
variable left censored (see Chrisman and Patel, 2012). We measure franchisor age as the 
number of  years the firm had been operating as a franchisor. We measure franchisor size as 
the number of  units owned and franchised by the franchisor. We logged both franchisor 
age and size because they were not normally distributed.
Covariates. In all our models, we controlled for franchisor age and size given that they may 
affect the behaviour and performance of  franchisors (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006b; Combs 
et al., 2009). In fact, franchisor age and size are regarded as standard control variables 
in franchising studies (see, among others, Barthélemy, 2008; Combs and Ketchen, 
1999b; Sorenson and Sorenson, 2001). In addition, scholars highlight the importance 
of  industry-level controls in franchising (Michael, 2003). Another important aspect 
commonly controlled for in the context of  franchising behaviour and performance is 
the distinction between franchised and company-owned units/outlets (Barthélemy, 2008; 
Combs and Ketchen, 1999b; Perdreau et al., 2015). Therefore, we controlled for the case 
in which a franchisor has company-owned units or not (coded ‘1’ if  yes, ‘0’ otherwise). 
Additionally, while some studies use measures for competitor density (Litz and Stewart, 
2000), market segment (Sorenson and Sorenson, 2001), or capital intensity (Madanoglu 
et al., 2011), we used the more common sector variables to control for industry effects 
(El Akremi et al., 2015; Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013). More specifically, we followed 
the SIC industry classification and used the construction and manufacturing industry 
as our reference category while employing three different dummy variables indicating 
whether a franchisor is active in retail and wholesale trade, finance, or services, respectively. 
To control for time dependency, we also incorporated the log of  time into the analyses 
(that is, log (year of  observation - first year of  observation + 1), which is superior to using 
year dummies (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Finally, to be conservative in 
our tests and to isolate the effects of  interest as precisely and parsimoniously as possible, 
we controlled for the other dependent variables that we consider in our study in the 
respective models. For instance, in Models 1 (Tables II and III), we use the number of  
contracts cancelled as the dependent variable; still, we added court actions, training, and 
performance as additional control variables.
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Controlling for endogeneity. It is possible that franchisors’ relationships with franchisees, 
training for franchisees, and performance are endogenous to the unique features of  the 
family firm franchisor versus the non-family firm franchisor. Stated somewhat differently, 
factors that might influence the relationship between franchisors and franchisees (such 
as contracts cancelled and court actions), training, and performance could also influence 
the desirability of  maintaining the franchisor firm as a family business.
We employed a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) model (see Patel et al., 2018; Terza 
et al., 2008) to control for potential endogeneity. The 2SRI estimator is similar to the 
linear two-stage least squares estimator except that in the second-stage regression, the 
first-stage predictors do not replace the endogenous variables; instead, first-stage residu-
als are included as additional regressors. We identified two instrumental variables: a) the 
location of  the franchisor’s headquarters and b) the number of  years in business before 
starting the franchising activity to correct for potential endogeneity. Both instruments 
may affect a family’s ability to extract private benefits from firm ownership and man-
agement while not directly affecting the franchisor-franchisees relationship, support, and 
performance (Bird and Wennberg, 2014; Miller et al., 2008). In the first stage, we used 
the instrumental variables to compute estimated values of  the problematic predictors; we 
then used those computed values in the second stage to estimate a model of  the depen-
dent variables (Kennedy, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, we controlled for the endoge-
neity score in all analyses (see Tables II and III; Chrisman and Patel, 2012).
RESULTS
We used panel data analysis with a random effect specification (Kennedy, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2002) in Stata to test the hypotheses. In Table I, we present the descrip-
tive statistics and correlations among the study’s variables. We conditioned our statistical 
analyses on the matched cases and controls FRANdata identified and tested the hy-
potheses within different models, as reported in Tables II and III. In Table II, we report 
the estimated coefficients when we use the family firm dummy variable. In Table III, 
we report the estimated coefficients when we use the variable capturing the number 
of  family executives. Given the characteristics of  the contracts cancelled and court ac-
tions’ variables (count variables that allow zeros), we utilized panel count models to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. To test Hypotheses 3 and 4 where performance is the dependent 
variable, we used panel regression (see Kennedy, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). Before cre-
ating the interaction terms, we standardized the variables to moderate multicollinearity 
problems, thus overcoming distortion of  the main effects that could arise because of  the 
tendency of  main effects and interaction terms to be highly correlated (Aiken and West, 
1991). Inspection of  the variance inflation factors (VIFs) showed that multicollinearity 
was not a concern: all VIF coefficients were lower than 5 (Hair et al., 2006).
Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively, predict that a family firm franchisor a) builds stronger 
relationships with franchisees and b) provides more training for them than a non-family 
firm franchisor does. The results in Models 1 (dependent variable: contracts cancelled) 
and 2 (dependent variable: number of  court actions) of  Tables II and III show mixed 
support for Hypothesis 1. As expected, the coefficients for the family firm dummy and 
the number of  family executives are both negative and significant in Models 1. Thus, the 
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results confirm that with a family firm franchisor, fewer contract cancellations occur be-
tween the franchisor and its franchisees. However, both coefficients are non-significant in 
Models 2 (Tables II and III), suggesting that there is no difference in the actions brought 
to court by the franchisor and franchisees in a family and in a non-family firm context.
The results in Models 3 of  Tables II and III support Hypothesis 2. As expected, the 
coefficients for the family firm dummy and the number of  family executives are both 
positive and significant, showing that family firm franchisors provide their franchisees 
with more training compared to their non-family counterparts. Models 4-6 (Tables II and 
III) show the results from testing Hypotheses 3 and 4. Hypothesis 3 states that a family 
firm franchisor achieves lower performance than a non-family firm franchisor. The coef-
ficients for the family firm dummy and the number of  family executives are negative and 
significant in Models 4 of  Tables II and III, respectively. These results support Hypothesis 
3. Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we followed Dawson and Richter (2006) and entered the 
Table II. Analyses of  hypotheses 1-4 (with family firm dummy)
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Contracts cancelled Court actions Training ROA ROA ROA
Hypothesis H1 H1 H2 H3  H4
Contracts cancelled  −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
Court actions −0.00*  −0.01+ −0.00 −0.00 0.00
Training 0.00 −0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00
Performance (ROA) −0.06 0.44 −0.01    
Franchisor age 0.14* 0.12 −0.01 −0.02* −0.01 −0.00
Franchisor size 1.39*** 0.51*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.01
Owned units (dummy) 0.05 −0.17 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02
Log of  time 0.16*** 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family dummy (FD) −0.37* −0.09 0.41*** −0.03* −0.04* −0.05**
FD × Franchisor age     −0.03 −0.02
FD × Franchisor size     0.07*** 0.07***
Franchisor 
age × Franchisor size
    0.02* 0.01
FD × Franchisor 
age × Franchisor size
     0.03*
       
Endogeneity score −3.36 −12.60 3.06 −0.01 −0.08 −0.06
       
Wald χ2 742.14 44.15 84.93 74.64 95.94 100.28
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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two-way  interaction  terms  in Models 5  (family  firm measures *  franchisor age;  family 
firm measures * franchisor size; franchisor age * franchisor size) and the three-way in-
teraction term in Models 6 (family firm measures * franchisor age * franchisor size). As 
predicted, the three way-interactions for both the family firm dummy and the number 
of  family executives were positive and significant (Models 6 in Tables II and III, respec-
tively). The plot of  the interaction (Figure 1) confirms that old and large family firm fran-
chisors achieve the highest level of  performance. This evidence supports Hypothesis 4.
Robustness Tests
First, we tested Hypothesis 2 with the two different measures of  training available (in 
class training and on-the-job training; Combs et al., 2004) employed separately. Findings 
supported Hypothesis 2 strongly; yet, interestingly, the results were stronger when ‘on-
the-job training’ (with family firm dummy: 1.25; p < 0.001; with family executives: 0.40; 
Table III. Analyses of  hypotheses 1-4 (with number of  family executives)
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Contracts cancelled Court actions Training ROA ROA ROA
Hypothesis H1 H1 H2 H3  H4
Contracts cancelled  −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
Court actions −0.00*  −0.01+ −0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 0.00 −0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00
Performance (ROA) −0.06 0.44 −0.01    
Franchisor age 0.14* 0.12 −0.00 −0.02* 0.01 0.02
Franchisor size 1.39*** 0.51*** −0.00 0.05*** −0.02 −0.03+
Owned units (dummy) 0.05 −0.17 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
Log of  time 0.16*** 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# family executives (FE) −0.13* −0.02 0.12*** −0.01* −0.02** −0.03***
FE × Franchisor age     −0.02*** −0.02**
FE × Franchisor size     0.05*** 0.05***
Franchisor 
age × Franchisor size
    0.02* −0.02
FE × Franchisor 
age × Franchisor size
     0.03***
       
Endogeneity score −3.81 −12.56 3.29 −0.03 −0.21 −0.19
       
Wald χ2 743.93 44.13 82.87 77.15 129.17 157.52
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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p < 0.001) rather than ‘in class training’ (with family firm dummy: 0.80; p < 0.001; 
with family executives: 0.22; p < 0.001) was the dependent variable. Second, even 
though ROA is a financial performance measure receiving strong support in the liter-
ature, we employed two alternative measures to test the stability and validity of  our 
findings. Specifically, we used a) Total Firm Sales and b) Return on Investment (ROI) 
to test Hypothesis 4. Results confirmed that family firm franchisors are more likely than 
non-family firm franchisors to achieve higher sales as both firm age and size increase 
(three-way interaction with family firm dummy: 0.39, p < 0.05; with family executives: 
0.15, p < 0.01). In addition, results supported (although marginally) our main findings 
with the ROI measure as well (three-way interaction with family firm dummy: 0.008, 
p < 0.10; with family executives: 0.003, p < 0.10).
Third, to obtain a more fine-grained understanding of  Hypothesis 4, we separated 
the total company units into company-franchised units and company-owned units – 
an important distinction that is subject to very intensive discussions in the literature 
(Castrogiovanni et al., 2006b). Specifically, we ran the three-way interaction effects sepa-
rately for company-franchised and company-owned units (see Models 1 to 4 in Table IV) 
while removing the control variable indicating whether a franchisor has company-owned 
units or not. Interestingly, both interactions (family firm measures * firm age * franchised 
units; family firm measures* firm age * owned units) are positive in all four models, but 
only those with franchised units are significant (Models 1 and 3). This result suggests that 
company-franchised units rather than company-owned units drive the positive interac-
tion effect with franchisor size.
Lastly, while we used the variables ‘number of  years in business before starting the 
franchising activity’ and the ‘location of  the franchisor headquarter’ as instrumental 
variables to control for potential endogeneity, they might also constitute meaningful con-
trol variables. Years in business before franchising reflects the experience before franchis-
ing (El Akremi et al., 2015); headquarter location proxies some location-related variance 
Figure 1. Firm age, firm size, and performance among family-firm franchisors and non-family-firm 
franchisors
Firm age, firm size, and performance
among family-firm franchisors and non-family-firm franchisors
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(Combs and Ketchen, 1999b). Therefore, we estimated a separate model without con-
trolling for endogeneity but with ‘years before franchising’ and ‘headquarter location’ 
as two additional control variables. The results remained stable. Relatedly, to assess the 
degree to which the set of  control variables we formed affect our results, we estimated 
different regression models where we first used no control variables at all and then when 
we used our control variables in different combinations (Hayes, 2018). In all of  these 
analyses, the results remained very consistent.
DISCUSSION
Drawing from resource-based theory and analysing a longitudinal dataset of  family and 
non-family franchisors, we find that the number of  contracts cancelled is significantly 
Table IV. Robustness tests for hypothesis 4
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ROA ROA ROA ROA
Family firm (FF) measure Family Dummy Family Dummy
# family 
executives
# family 
executives
Contracts cancelled −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
Court actions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00
Log of  time 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchisor age −0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.02
Franchised units (#) 0.01 0.04*** −0.02 0.04***
Owned units (#) 0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.01
Family firm measure (FF) −0.05** −0.03+ −0.03*** −0.01*
FF × Franchisor age −0.02 0.00 −0.02** −0.00
FF × Franchised units 0.06**  0.04***  
Firm age × Franchised units 0.01  −0.01  
FF × Firm age × Franchised units 0.03*  0.02***  
FF × Owned units  0.02  0.01+
Firm age × Owned units  −0.00  −0.01
FF × Firm age × Owned units  0.01  0.00
Endogeneity score 0.23 0.05 0.24 −0.05
     
Wald χ2 90.30 70.08 131.55 75.51
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
+p < 0.10;*p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001.
 Family versus Non-Family Firm Franchisors 23
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management 
Studies and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
lower for family firm franchisors; we also find that there is no significant difference 
regarding the number of  actions brought to court. As such, we discover partial support 
for our prediction that family firm franchisors build stronger relationships with franchi-
sees than non-family firm franchisors. Moreover, we reveal that family firm franchisors 
engage in more training activities with franchisees than non-family firm franchisors do. 
Also, our analyses confirm that non-family firm franchisors outperform family firm fran-
chisors and that this pattern reverses when family firm franchisors are older and larger. 
Taken together, we demonstrate that family firm franchisors differ from non-family firm 
franchisors regarding franchising behaviour and performance in very important ways. 
These insights offer valuable contributions to two literature streams: corporate entrepre-
neurship and franchising.
Contributions to the Corporate Entrepreneurship Literature
There is relatively little research framed around franchising as a phenomenon in the 
corporate entrepreneurship literature. This is somewhat surprising in that viewing fran-
chising as a type of  external corporate venturing (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999) in-
tersects with corporate entrepreneurship as an entrepreneurial activity. Additionally, a 
number of  scholars highlight the importance of  gaining a greater understanding of  the 
behaviours and resulting outcomes of  entrepreneurial actions of  individuals working in 
companies with different organizational forms such as franchising (see Ucbasaran et al., 
2001). Through this study, we contribute to the corporate entrepreneurship literature by 
depicting franchising as a unique and prevalent form of  firm-level corporate entrepre-
neurship. As such, this work adds to the existing debate about the legitimacy of  the view 
that franchising is a viable type of  entrepreneurship (Ketchen et al., 2011).
Moreover, our research provides several valuable contributions to the increasing num-
ber of  studies dealing with corporate entrepreneurship in family firms (Kellermanns and 
Eddleston, 2006; McKelvie et al., 2014; Zahra et al., 2004). Scholars completing research 
in this domain are focusing on different aspects of  corporate entrepreneurship such as 
entrepreneurial orientation (e.g., Chirico et al., 2011b; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012) or 
internal corporate venturing (Minola et al., 2016). In this work, we seek to examine the 
position that franchising offers a promising and rich context to study differences in en-
trepreneurial behaviors and outcomes between family and non-family firm franchisors.
In particular, we contribute to academic dialogues occurring around three distinct but 
related issues. The first one addresses the question of  whether family firms are more or 
less entrepreneurial than non-family firms (Eddleston et al., 2012; Randolph et al., 2017). 
Here, we theorize that there are differences in central aspects of  franchising, with family 
firm franchisors establishing stronger relationships with their franchisees and providing 
more in class and on-the-job training to them. We interpret this as a signal of  family firm 
franchisors exhibiting a stronger commitment and devotion to strengthen franchising as 
a type of  firm-level entrepreneurial behaviour compared to non-family firm franchisors. 
Accumulating resources effectively as a foundation for developing capabilities that fran-
chisors and franchisees may use to create value for stakeholders is an outcome of  this 
strong commitment.
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The second debate refers to the resulting performance differences between family 
and non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller and LeBreton-Miller, 2006; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In this regard, we theorize and empirically reveal an intrigu-
ing and novel pattern: while family firm franchisors tend to invest more in franchisees’ 
relationships and training, this still leads them to underperform compared to non-family 
firm franchisors. This logic appears to indicate that their franchise-related investments are 
less likely to pay off  in performance-related terms. This disadvantage, however, reverses 
as family firm franchisors age and grow in size. As such, our theory offers novel theoreti-
cal arguments suggesting that efficient structuring, bundling, and leveraging of  resources 
and the organizational learning that results from these processes take time and require an 
appropriate firm size and age in specific contexts. In particular, in line with Poppo and 
Zenger’s (2002) work concerned with formal contracts and relational governance func-
tions, our theoretical reasoning implies that the members of  an older and larger family 
firm franchisor are able to efficiently couple their high levels of  relational governance with 
increasingly customized franchising contracts that maximize performance outcomes. As a 
whole, our work signals that being a family firm can pay off  over time in entrepreneurial 
and performance-related aspects. This finding challenges the conjecture that the commit-
ment to entrepreneurial actions in family firms erodes over time and as the business grows 
in size (e.g., Chirico and Salvato, 2016; Naldi et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2003).
Relatedly, given arguments that conceptualizing corporate entrepreneurship as a spe-
cific type of  strategy is appropriate (Ireland et al., 2009), our work suggests the possibil-
ity that family firms engaging in franchising activities may deliberately form a specific 
strategy to do so. An entrepreneurial strategic vision is part of  such a strategy as it is a 
determination of  the entrepreneurial processes and behaviours a firm may choose to fol-
low to implement its chosen strategy. Cultivating stronger relationships with franchisees 
and offering value-creating training opportunities to them are examples of  behaviours 
family firm franchisors may want to pursue if  they were to develop a corporate entrepre-
neurship strategy around their choice of  franchising as a means of  conducting business.
To summarize, the overall picture emerging from our study is that family firms, at 
least family firm franchisors, appear to have a stronger commitment to developing and 
implementing a corporate entrepreneurship strategy – in the form of  franchising – 
compared to non-family firms. Still, family firm franchisors underperform their non-fam-
ily counterparts until they become older and larger. With these insights, we enhance our 
understanding of  the behavioural and performance differences in franchising as a type 
of  entrepreneurial behaviour between two different organizational forms and reveal the 
boundary conditions under which family firm franchisors over- or underperform relative 
to non-family franchisors. The pattern we reveal is novel to the corporate entrepreneur-
ship literature and calls for validation with respect to other factors (e.g., entrepreneurial 
orientation), practices (e.g., internal corporate venturing), and organizational forms (e.g., 
non-profit organizations).
Contributions to the Franchising Literature
Even though family firms play a key role in franchising (Chirico et al., 2011a; Welsh and 
Hoy, 2017; Welsh and Raven, 2011), research completed to examine the franchising 
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phenomenon in this organizational form is surprisingly scarce. To contribute to the lit-
erature, we developed what we believe are novel theoretical arguments that draw a more 
nuanced picture of  franchising.
In relation to franchising performance, to the best of  our knowledge, our work is the 
first to offer fine-grained insights and empirical evidence that the franchisor’s form of  
governance (family firm versus non-family firm) is a central determinant of  performance. 
Second, and consistent with Combs et al. (2004, p. 916) who assert that ‘any relation-
ship between franchising and performance is at best contingent on other factors’, a key 
insight flowing from our theory and related results is that the difference between family 
and non-family franchisors depends on the franchisor’s age and size. This insight speaks 
directly to previous franchising scholarship reporting mixed theoretical reasoning and 
results regarding the effects of  age and size on franchisor outcomes (e.g., Bordonaba-
Juste et al., 2011; Combs and Ketchen, 2003; Kosová and Lafontaine, 2010). Our corre-
sponding additional analysis, where we considered the number of  company-franchised 
units and company-owned units separately, also yields important insights. In this analysis, 
only the three-way interaction term with the company-franchised units is significant (see 
Models 1 and 3 in Table IV). This finding implies that the family firm franchisor’s age 
is crucial for firm performance; nonetheless, in relation to the family firm franchisor’s 
total size, the number of  company-franchised units is what actually matters. Overall, the 
insights flowing from our work inform our understanding of  franchising and the research 
completed to study the phenomenon. Specifically, our results demonstrate that ignoring 
the family business aspect in franchising relationships and outcomes may prevent re-
searchers from identifying important patterns.
Second, in relation to potential actions and behaviours occurring within a franchising 
relationship, a non-finding that deserves attention as a means of  expanding our under-
standing of  the franchisor-franchisee relationship in multiple contexts is that the number 
of  actions brought to court does not differ between family and non-family firm franchi-
sors. A possible explanation of  this finding is that family firm franchisors, in line with 
our initial theoretical reasoning, are likely to establish stronger relationships with their 
franchisees. This, in turn, should make court action less likely per se. On the other hand, 
problems in the family franchisor-franchisee relationship might become more emotional 
than with non-family firm franchisors. This is because it is not only a business but also 
a more emotional relationship in that the business involves family dynamics. As a result, 
the parties involved might choose to rely on court actions not only for business reasons 
but for emotional ones as well. Collectively, emotional dynamics may thus offset the 
lower basic likelihood of  taking court actions.
Lastly, we respond to the call for scholars to use the resource-based view of  the firm 
as a theoretical lens to examine franchising phenomena, particularly behavioural and 
performance-related outcomes (e.g., Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; Combs et al., 2004; 
Combs et al., 2011b); at the same time, we expand the stream of  research on resource 
management and orchestration (Chirico et al., 2011b; Sirmon et al., 2007; Sirmon 
et al., 2011) by investigating resource management activities that occur between firms 
(i.e., franchisors and franchisees). For our purpose of  investigating corresponding dif-
ferences between family and non-family firm franchisors, drawing from resource-based 
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theory and the related resource management implications across organizations facili-
tated our efforts to develop compelling theoretical arguments.
Managerial and Social Implications
As a managerial implication, our study highlights that business families in the franchis-
ing sector need to be patient while pursuing desired, performance-related outcomes. 
Specifically, involving the family in the franchising business improves social relationships 
and knowledge sharing, yet, it pays off  financially if  the business family as well as other 
stakeholders are truly long-term oriented in terms of  waiting for the family firm franchi-
sor to age and grow. In that sense, being a family franchisor involves hard work that leads 
to higher performance in the long run compared to non-family franchisors. Moreover, 
we demonstrate the importance of  family-firm franchisors recognizing that the resources 
and skills they provide to franchisees through strong relationships and training efforts 
become the foundations for capability development. We believe that the most effective 
relationships between franchisors and franchisees are those oriented to finding ways to 
accumulate resources for conversion into value-creating capabilities. When this hap-
pens, the likelihood of  earning positive returns increases for both franchising parties. 
Understanding these mechanisms and family dynamics has the potential to generate im-
portant implications for the society overall, for instance in terms of  enhanced job security 
and financial and non-financial value creation within and across communities.
Limitations and Implications for Future Research
The limitations associated with our work suggest several issues to explore in future re-
search studies. First, as the franchisors and franchisees in our sample are US-based, 
generalizability of  our results in other regions and countries is an issue warranting con-
sideration. This is an intriguing issue in that there is a host of  franchise regulations in 
more than 30 countries outside the United States. Yet, while the extent and type of  regu-
lations may vary to some extent, the core aspects remain essentially identical. Because of  
this, we are confident that the main arguments we explicate in this study concerning fam-
ily firm franchising in general and family-firm franchisor behaviour and performance in 
particular are valid across contexts. Supporting this conclusion are results reported by 
Falbe and Welsh (1998), who found that the franchise model (e.g., contract, fees etc.) did 
not change when US franchisors established operations in Canada and Mexico.
Second, because of  data limitations, we do not consider succession, an event that 
can be difficult in family firms and can lead to firm failure when handled ineffectively. 
When succession occurs, it can affect franchise relationships and results strongly. Future 
studies should focus on understanding how to nurture and maintain value-creating re-
lationships during times of  succession. Additionally, scholars could examine the extent 
to which franchisors proactively provide succession training and contractual advantages 
to multi-generational governing franchisee families. Scholars could choose to examine 
succession from both a franchisor and franchisee perspective. Third, data limitations 
prevented us from examining generational differences in family firm franchisors. For 
example, third-generation family members now lead a number of  McDonald’s fran-
chisees that started in the 1950s. Differences in leadership practices followed by a new 
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generation of  franchisees may affect actions taken in concert with the franchisor. In addi-
tion, because a relationship between two parties can be multifaceted and complex, using 
more fine-grained measures to capture it is desirable. Doing this is challenging though in 
that collecting the necessary data is difficult. The franchise industry, in general, is partic-
ularly ‘private’ and avoids disclosure of  information, including anonymous surveys. This 
is a result, in part, of  litigation, government oversight, and negative press over the years.
Fourth, one might wonder if  the approach of  identifying family firms by checking 
whether two or more executives have the same family name is robust enough, particu-
larly in case of  very common surnames. In some countries such as China, for instance, 
we may expect this approach to have limitations. However, we believe that this is not a 
critical issue in our study in that we validated the status of  the family firms in our sam-
ple with a very careful and comprehensive procedure using secondary materials and 
follow-up phone calls. Moreover, such an approach is used commonly (see Deephouse 
and Jaskiewicz, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2013). Nonetheless, schol-
ars conducting studies in the future should try to gather additional data – or at least repli-
cate our in-depth double-checking procedure. Relatedly, comparing family to non-family 
firms is challenging because making a ‘black or white’ distinction is not always easy 
(Klein et al., 2005). We believe though that our corresponding matched sample approach 
is appropriate and effective in that we not only employed a family firm dummy in our 
empirical analyses but also a continuous measure capturing the number of  family execu-
tives. Of  course, future studies investigating the family versus non-family firm distinction 
in more nuanced ways have strong potential to contribute meaningfully to the literature.
Fifth, while we base our arguments on the notion that franchisor age and size are asso-
ciated positively with favourable reputation for a firm, we could not measure reputation 
explicitly in our dataset. Future studies could do so and investigate whether reputation 
does, indeed, increase with franchisor age and size (and to what degree this differs be-
tween family and non-family firm franchisors). In fact, there might be scenarios where 
reputation declines over time while the firm grows. Studying the outcomes associated 
with such a relationship between reputation and firm size has the potential to yield in-
teresting results. Relatedly, it would be valuable to explore whether and how reputation 
changes in the short- and long-term when, for instance, a family firm franchisor becomes 
a non-family firm franchisor (or the reverse).
Sixth, while we use a set of  control variables that we developed in light of  results 
flowing from previous empirical franchising studies, data limitations prevented us from 
controlling for additional factors that might affect our findings. Examples of  these vari-
ables include internal access to resources (Barthélemy, 2008), investment amount, fees, 
and royalties (El Akremi et al., 2015), exclusive territory and resale price maintenance 
clauses, and geographic dispersion (Combs and Ketchen, 1999b). Lastly, our measure-
ment instrument for training provided by franchisors covers required training but not po-
tential additional voluntary training elements. Future studies could gather corresponding 
information and replicate our results with a combined or separate measure(s). Moreover, 
examining potential differences between required and voluntary training might lead to 
finer grained insights.
In addition to highlighting research opportunities emerging because of  our study’s lim-
itations, there are avenues for future studies flowing from our results. In an overall sense, 
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we believe our study suggests a need for additional research concerned with franchising 
in the family firm context. In our view, there is significant research potential associated 
with efforts designed to examine how family-related aspects (e.g., motives, values, or fam-
ily involvement in general) affect behaviours and performance in the franchising context. 
Consistent with specifications of  the relationships analysed in our work, we conclude that 
resource-based theory is appropriate to inform the specification of  relationships to study 
regarding various family-related aspects in the franchising context.
Related to the issue of  theory, we note that as detailed earlier in our paper, several 
reasons support our decision to draw primarily from resource-based theory to specify 
the relationships we examined empirically. Nonetheless, combining resource-based the-
ory with others to specify franchising relationships to study is promising. For instance, 
combining resource-based view arguments with institutional theory insights (Combs 
et al., 2009) may hold promise to identify factors with the strongest influence on the per-
formance of  global franchising chains. In addition, it might be promising to examine the 
ownership redirection hypothesis (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969) in family versus non-family 
firms, whereby a combination with agency theory could yield interesting relationships 
to test (Combs and Ketchen, 2003; Gillis et al., 2014). Future studies may also rely on 
transaction cost theory (North, 1992) to study contractual franchising relationships and 
the related specific assets that are particularly suitable and important when analysing 
franchising in family firms. It would also be interesting to examine the results of  decisions 
by family franchisors to transition to non-family status through IPOs, MBOs, and take-
overs. For instance, are family-firm franchisors more likely to become acquisition targets 
than non-family firm franchisors? Here, we would assume that preferences and resource- 
related dynamics change considerably. Such changes might affect the behaviours and 
performance of  franchisors.
We also believe that a decision by corporate entrepreneurship scholars to focus more 
on the franchising phenomenon in future research efforts has the potential to yield in-
sights. In fact, we believe that adopting an entrepreneurship lens to study franchising 
issues has the potential to increase our understanding of  the drivers and outcomes of  
firm-level corporate entrepreneurship in family versus non-family firms. Lastly and re-
latedly, we believe that our theorizing and findings inform the analysis of  other forms of  
corporate entrepreneurship. For instance, scholars could investigate how family-related 
and family-influenced resources affect behavioural and performance-related differences 
in the context of  other entrepreneurial activities that fall into the category of  ‘external 
corporate venturing’ such as spin-offs or joint ventures (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). 
Moreover, the mechanisms we identified could also be ‘at work’ when corporate ventur-
ing is conducted internally (i.e., internal corporate venturing, see Minola et al., 2016).
To conclude, drawing from resource-based theory arguments, our predictions and re-
sults suggest that family firm franchisors behave and perform differently than non-family 
firm franchisors. We hope that our study will stimulate further examination of  the dif-
ferences between family and non-family firms as well as the heterogeneity within family 
firms in the franchising context. We believe that additional scholarship has the potential 
to inform our nascent understanding of  family firm franchising activities and the out-
comes resulting from them.
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NOTES
 [1] The most recent statistics available predict 759,236 (+1.9 per cent) franchise establishments employing 
8,172,000 (+3.7 per cent) individuals with $757.2 billion (+6.2 per cent) in output and contributing 
$451.4 billion (+6.1 per cent) to GDP for 2018 in the United States (IHS Market Economics, 2018).
 [2] We thank one of  the anonymous reviewers for this important suggestion.
 [3] Required by the U.S. federal government, FDDs were known previously as Uniform Franchise Offering 
Circulars (FRANdata, 2012; Moy, 2016).
 [4] For firm size, FRANdata performed the matching with a 20 per cent margin of  difference.
 [5] As a robustness test, we re-ran all the analyses with the inclusion of  this company as well. The results 
from this analysis do not differ substantially from those reported herein.
 [6] An example of  a large franchisor going bankrupt is Mrs. Fields Famous Brands, the parent company 
of  both the cookie chain ‘Mrs. Fields’ and the frozen yogurt chain ‘TCBY’. See https://www.cnbc.
com/2014/10/31/10-famed -ameri can-franc hises -that-faced -finan cial-ruin.html
 [7] We expect our results to hold in more recent datasets as well. Franchising is a very stable type of  busi-
ness in terms of  arrangements between franchisors and franchisees. For instance, in 1979 the Federal 
Trade Commission passed the Franchise Disclosure Act (Rule 436.1), requiring 23 sections that a fran-
chise disclosure document (FDD) is to contain. This Act was amended only in 2007 with very marginal 
changes, which indicates that the core practices and basic tenets associated with franchising have re-
mained very stable over long periods of  time (Judd and Justis, 2008).
 [8] Cancelled contracts do not include retirement. In the case of  retirement, parties must still satisfy a con-
tract’s terms. FRANdata captures retirement in a different category. We thank an anonymous reviewer 
for this insight.
 [9] As such, the ‘provision of  training’ is measured by capturing the amount of  ‘required training’. We note 
that franchisors might also provide additional training to franchisees on a voluntary basis. This possibil-
ity, however, is not captured in our data given that the corresponding information is not available from 
FRANdata.
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